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ABSTRACT  
Critics argue that inflation targeting (IT) has met its demise in face of the current 
financial crisis. As such, price-level targeting and nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP) targeting have been proposed as alternatives, but to date no country has 
made the switch – why is this so? Existing literature tends to treat the choice of 
targeting regime as a function of economic theory, empirical precedents, and policy 
execution constraints. I find this analytical framework insufficient; otherwise, we 
should observe at least some countries exiting IT regimes in light of the arguments 
made thus far. In order to explain why governments have yet to make the switch 
away from IT, I propose that a fourth determinant needs to be added to the 
framework – politics. Based on this framework, I conclude that IT has yet to meet its 
demise. 
 
JEL: E52, E58, E61, E65 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, inflation stability is an important macroeconomic goal pursued by 
governments worldwide. Since the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 came 
into effect, nearly thirty central banks around the world have adopted inflation 
targeting (IT) regimes in hopes of achieving this goal.3 (Warburton and Davies, 2012) 
More than twenty years on and in face of the current global financial crisis, however, 
some critics argue that IT has not lived up to its promise. (cf. Stiglitz, 2008; Frankel, 
2012) 
 
“Today, inflation targeting is been put to the test – and it will almost 
certainly fail (sic)” 
 ~ Joseph Stiglitz (2008) 
 
Its key failure was that under IT regimes, central banks were unable to detect and 
control asset price inflation, as well as the build up of household and corporate debt. 
(cf. Frankel, 2012; Kemp, 2009) In the current global financial crisis, this significantly 
influenced overall inflation, which led to systematic deviations from promised inflation 
rates. Debate is now rife on whether Stiglitz was right in his prediction of IT’s future. 
Notably, the discussion seems to have intensified following Frankel’s tribute to ‘the 
death of inflation targeting’ in a recent weblog post. (Frankel, 2012; cf. Altig, 2010; 
Kemp, 2009; Sumner, 2012) The question at hand is: Is inflation targeting really 
dead? If it is, what targeting regime should replace it?  
 
The possible alternatives that have been offered are price-level targeting (PLT) and 
nominal GDP targeting (NGDPT). Yet despite seemingly compelling arguments 
against maintaining IT, no IT country has made any switches to date. Why is this so? 
This brings us to a more fundamental question: ‘How does a country decide on its 
targeting regime (TR)?’ 
                                                      
 
3 As of 2012, there are 27 explicit inflation-targeting regimes worldwide. Three countries (Finland, 
Slovakia and Spain) had originally adopted inflation targeting regimes, but have exited the regime 
since joining the European Union. (Hammond, 2012) See Annex A for a list of all inflation targeting 
countries to date. 
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Existing arguments in this debate for and against IT suggest that TR choice can be 
thought of as a function of the following three determinants: economic theory, 
empirical precedents, and policy execution constraints, which we illustrate as follows: 
 
Choice of Targeting Regime = 𝒇(economics; experience; execution) 
 
However, monetary policy (MP) depends as much on politics as it does on 
considerations of economics and precedents. (cf. Alesina and Stella, 2010; Hind, 
2012) Even where MP is delegated to independent central banks, politics remains 
inevitably intertwined with policy. (cf. Hind, 2012) For example, partisanship and 
government ideology have been identified as statistically significant influences on the 
adoption of inflation targeting. (cf. Mukherjee and Singer, 2008) 
 
Therefore, I argue that the existing analytical framework is insufficient to explain why 
governments have yet to make the switch from IT to other TRs. Instead, we require a 
framework that includes political factors in order to analyse the present debate on 
inflation targeting’s demise comprehensively. Thus, I propose to incorporate politics 
as a fourth determinant of regime choice, i.e. 
 
Choice of Targeting Regime = 𝒇(economics; experience; execution; politics) 
 
Using this extended framework, I conduct case study analyses of four countries: 
Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States.4 I conclude from 
these case studies that politics is indeed a fourth determinant that can explain why 
governments did not or have yet to make the switch to other TRs even though 
arguments for switching are compelling based on the 3-variable framework. In 
particular, even though economic theory and the experience of the current crisis 
suggest that IT has failed and met its demise, we find good reasons to think that 
governments will not be making the switch from IT to PLT or NGDPT anytime soon. 
                                                      
 
4 In January 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced for the first time an 
explicit, numerical inflation target of 2% annually. We take this as an indicator that the US has joined 
the league of IT regimes. (Spicer, J., 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2012) 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this section, I highlight arguments for and against three MP regimes (IT, PLT, 
NGDPT), through which we can infer a 3-variable framework of TR choice. Then, I 
provide arguments for the inclusion of politics into TR choice from two perspectives. 
First, current literature already shows that politics is an important determinant of 
various aspects of MP. (cf. Woolley, 1983; Alesina and Stella, 2010) Second, 
targeting regime choice in particular is inevitably tied to political considerations. (cf. 
Mukherjee and Singer, 2008) Finally, I present the proposed 4-variable framework as 
an extension of present theory. 
 
2.1 THE 3-VARIABLE FRAMEWORK OF TR CHOICE 
Three types of TRs will be discussed in this paper: IT, PLT and NGDPT. The latter 
two have been chosen based on existing debates of TR choice, as they seem to be 
the best alternatives feasible for central banks aside from IT. We begin by defining 
these regimes. 
 
Following Svensson and Bernanke et al, inflation targeting (IT) is a framework for 
monetary policy characterised by (i) the public announcement of official quantitative 
targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons, and 
(ii) the explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation targeting is MP’s primary 
long-run goal. Among other important features of inflation are (iii) vigorous efforts to 
communicate with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary 
authorities, (iv) mechanisms that measure the central bank’s accountability for 
attaining those objectives. (cf. Svensson, 2007; Bernanke et al, 1999) 
 
Price-level Targeting (PLT) is very similar in spirit to IT, but as its name suggests, 
central banks set a target for the price-level instead of inflation rate. If the target is 
met, the outcomes under IT and PLT are the same, i.e. inflation as measured by the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is kept stable at the target. However, when the target 
is missed, the IT central bank would have to take the necessary actions to get 
inflation back to its target. When successful, this puts the price level on a new path 
parallel to but permanently below its original path. (See Figure 1) The PLT central 
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bank, on the other hand, would undertake policies to return the price level to the 
original path instead, even though doing so would require the short-term inflation rate 
to exceed the target, e.g. as illustrated by the line segment AB in Figure 1, until the 
price level has made up for its earlier shortfall. (Dolan, 2011) 
 
 
(Source: Dolan, 2011) 
 
Figure 1: Difference in treatment of missed target, PLT vs. IT 
 
Unlike IT or PLT, Nominal GDP Targeting involves the central bank setting a target 
for the level of nominal gross domestic product (hence NGDP), i.e. the level of output 
before accounting for inflation, which makes it a target that incorporates both goals 
of macroeconomic stabilisation – output and inflation. Aside from the target, central 
banks that adopt NGDPT follow in principle a similar policy regime as with IT and 
PLT. 
 
2.1.1 ECONOMIC THEORY 
Most of the arguments in favour of PLT or NGDPT as an alternative to IT are based 
on considerations of economic theory.  
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For example, PLT has been suggested as an alternative to IT because it does not 
‘let bygones be bygones’. As described, when the target is missed, IT will simply 
ignore previous missed inflation targets and aim to return current inflation to its 
target. In doing so, it moves away from the original price-level path – an outcome 
that PLT would never allow. This means that PLT will be better able to control the 
movement of price-levels, and in theory, providing more certainty about the long-
term purchasing power of money. (Economist.com, 2010)  
 
NGDPT has also been suggested as an alternative to IT. Its advantage relative to IT 
is its robustness, particularly with respect to supply shocks and terms-of-trade shock, 
i.e. under NGDPT central banks are able to respond to output shocks without 
treating them as inflation shocks. For example, if the European Central Bank had 
adopted an NGDP target, it could have avoided the mistake made in July 2008, 
when just as the economy was going into recession, it responded to a spike in world 
oil prices by raising interest rates to fight consumer price inflation. (Guardian.co.uk, 
2012) 
 
We can conclude that the arguments above share an underlying assumption: 
economic considerations should inform TR choice, i.e. if it is well grounded in 
economic theory, countries should switch from IT to PLT or NGDPT. 
 
2.1.2 EMPIRICAL PRECEDENTS 
Another theme that is commonly highlighted in the debate on TR choice is the 
availability of empirical precedents for each TR.  In particular, although economic 
theory suggests that PLT and NGDPT is grounded in equally good, if not better 
economic sense as compared to IT, common arguments against the adoption of PLT 
or NGDPT cite the lack of empirical precedents as a deterrence from adopting either. 
(cf. Hendrickson, 2012) 
 
This line of argument suggests that we can also think of TR choice as being 
determined by the availability of empirical precedents, i.e. precedents are a 
determinant of TR choice. However, those who have made empirical precedents the 
focus of their arguments may have been unnecessarily harsh in their critique. Given 
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that empirical precedent is a determinant of TR choice, current available information 
suggests that we should be more optimistic about switching to PLT or NGDPT.  
 
In theory, the idea of targeting nominal GDP has existed since the 1980s, when 
many macroeconomists saw it as a logical solution to the difficulties of targeting 
money supply. (Guardian.co.uk, 2012) In practice, Drum pointed out that countries 
have been keeping track of nominal output for as long as they have kept track of 
inflation, and most central banks have also kept a close eye on the path of NGDP – 
either explicitly or implicitly – by putting weight on both inflation and real output in 
making policy decisions (e.g. Taylor rules). (Economist.com, 2011) 
 
With respect to PLT, Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of Canada, argued that 
IT fosters financial instability. In theory, a central bank that wants to control 
excessive borrowing will not have an incentive to raise interest rates if it pushed 
inflation below target. If it targeted the price level over a period of time instead, it 
could justify a temporary decline in that level provided it later made up the lost 
ground. (Economist.com, 2010) In practice, PLT has actually been implemented in 
Sweden, when the Riksbank adopted a price-level target in the early 1930s. 
Furthermore, the price-level target is not so different from the inflation target in that 
both would make use of headline CPI as the target measure, which makes 
arguments citing the lack of empirical precedents against PLT and NGDPT rather 
weak. 
 
2.1.3 POLICY EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS 
Moving on, the debate about which TR to adopt (or whether to give up a TR) also 
commonly introduces practical policy considerations. In particular, a key argument 
against PLT is that its success depends on the way public expectations are formed – 
something that is extremely difficult for the central bank to assess. In an ideal 
scenario, PLT will be highly effective if the public is forward-looking, as inflation 
expectations would adjust more easily to the central bank’s shifting target than if the 
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public was backward-looking.5 (cf. Economist.com, 2010) This may seem simple in 
theory, but will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the central bank to 
anticipate. A similar argument is made against NGDPT, where the target is thought 
to be overly complex for the public to understand in its execution. If the public is 
unable to grasp the policy target intuitively, it will be difficult to influence inflation 
expectations reliably and thus defeat the effectiveness of the regime. 
 
However, just as arguments against the lack of empirical precedents were weak, the 
argument regarding policy execution constraints seems to hold little water when 
raised against PLT and NGDPT. In particular, there is a much more pressing policy 
constraint that faces IT, one that arguably justifies the risk of moving to PLT or 
NGDPT where other policy constraints would arise – specifically the impotence of 
monetary policy via controlling interest rates as nominal interest rates hit the zero 
lower bound in many countries. 
 
2.1.4 CONCLUSIONS OF THE 3-VARIABLE FRAMEWORK 
The arguments presented above suggest that existing theory concerning the choice 
of TR can be summarised as follows: 
 
Choice of Targeting Regime =  𝒇(economics, experience, execution) 
 
If TR choice is indeed a function of these considerations, then there appears to be a 
strong case for countries to exit IT regimes and to adopt PLT or NGDPT instead. Yet, 
as foreshadowed, this is hardly so. In fact, no IT regime appears to be anywhere 
near an exit from the regime despite the fervent debate that has taken place. This 
suggests that there is more to the choice of targeting regime than the 
                                                      
 
5 Research by the Bank of Canada suggested that if more than 40% of the public based their 
expectations on rules of thumb or past inflation, price-level targeting would lose its edge over inflation 
targeting. (cf. Economist.com, 2010) 
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aforementioned considerations. This missing determinant, as I shall propose, is 
politics. 
 
2.2 POLITICS AS A DETERMINANT OF TR CHOICE 
In this paper, I use ‘politics’ to refer a variable that summarises the effects of 
governments’ desire for re-election, dynamics of public opinion, and the dynamics of 
legislative and bureaucratic behaviour. That is, politics in the context of TR choice 
refers to anything arising from the government or its subsidiaries that are (a) 
independent of the central bank and (b) has an influence on central banking. In doing 
so, I effectively define politics to be what Woolley termed ‘Type I’ politics, which are 
concerned with ‘variable governmental’ factors that are typical in studies of monetary 
policy.6 (Woolley, 1983)7 
 
2.2.1 POLITICS AS A DETERMINANT OF MP 
Existing literature has shown that even where MP is delegated to an independent 
central bank, politics continues to affect its operation. For example, Woolley 
presented a wide range of political factors that had been studied in relation to 
monetary policy and showed that although a rigorous modelling of politics and its 
influence on monetary policy may be complex in practice, political factors can and do 
affect the way monetary policy is carried out around the world. (Woolley, 1983) In 
addition, Duesenberry argued that, using studies of the Federal Reserve from post-
war to late 20th century, central bank policy (in the United States) is indeed 
influenced by political considerations. (Duesenberry, 1983)  
 
                                                      
 
6  Governmental and non-governmental factors distinguish those that directly involve the legally 
constituted process of governing from those that, while important for governing, are characteristics of 
the nongovernmental organization of society. Variable and non-variable factors distinguish between 
rapidly and slowly changing political factors. Variable governmental factors are thus factors that 
are rapidly changing and involve the legally constituted process of governing. (Woolley, 1983) 
Refer to Annex B for Woolley’s typology of political variables studied by students of macroeconomic 
policy. 
7 This definition has been left intentionally broad, as the aim is to introduce the consideration of at 
least some political variables into an analysis of TR choice. As will be discussed in Section 4 and the 
conclusion, any further specification of this variable is outside the scope of this paper and can 
perhaps be taken up in further studies that try to develop a rigorous model of this framework. 
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2.2.2 POLITICS AS A DETERMINANT OF TR CHOICE 
Following the thesis that politics is a determinant of monetary policy, Mukherjee and 
Singer (2008) studied government partisanship and adoption of IT across 78 
countries, finding strong statistical support for the argument that countries are more 
likely to adopt IT when there is conformity of preferences for low-inflation monetary 
policy between the government and the central bank. This suggests that there are 
some political considerations at play when countries contend with the choice of TR. 
Given that such considerations are general and likely to exist regardless of the 
specific nature of the choice, it seems reasonable to conclude that political 
considerations would be pervasive throughout all TR choices (e.g. adoption of PLT, 
NGDPT, etc). 
 
Yet, aside from Mukherjee and Singer (2008) who studied the effects of government 
partisanship on the likelihood of a country adopting an IT regime, it appears that 
none of the existing literature on IT adoption have attempted to include politics as a 
determinant of TR choice.8 This is a surprise, as the choice of targeting regime is 
certainly as much a political issue as any other aspect of monetary policy, given that 
governments and central banks have to negotiate on the issue. Therefore this paper 
hopes to address this gap in the literature by studying the relevance of politics as a 
determinant of TR choice.  
 
2.3 THE PROPOSED 4-VARIABLE FRAMEWORK OF TARGETING REGIME CHOICE 
In view of the above arguments, it seems reasonable to suppose that politics can 
and should be included in an analytical framework of TR choice as follows: 
 
Choice of Targeting Regime =  𝒇(economics, experience, execution , politics) 
 
                                                      
 
8 In particular, countries are more likely to adopt IT when there is conformity of preferences for low-
inflation monetary policy between the government and the central bank. More specifically, the 
combination of a right-leaning government and a central bank without bank regulatory authority is 
likely to be associated with the adoption of IT. (Mukherjee and Singer, 2008) 
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In proposing this theoretical framework, I argue that although considerations of 
economic theory, empirical precedents, and policy execution point favourably to a 
change in TR, political considerations have a significant influence over TR choice 
that can explain why TR change is in practice not undertaken.  
3 CASE STUDIES 
 
In this section, I present four case studies of countries’ experiences with TR change, 
providing some background as well as outlook in the near future, i.e. for the next 
three to five years. I highlight in particular how politics has played a role in the 
debate about ‘monetary policy innovation’, i.e. switching TRs. In line with the final 
thesis that I will establish regarding the demise of inflation, I have chosen countries 
that have drawn some debate regarding the adoption of IT as well as the future of IT. 
However, the analysis is not limited to IT and its demise. Rather, the adoption of IT is 
also discussed where relevant as it supports the thesis that politics is a determinant 
of TR choice in general.  
 
Table 1 provides a summary of facts covered in the rest of this section. 
 
 New Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
Canada United States 
IT adopted 1989 1992 1991 2012 
Target 2% 1 – 3% 1 – 3% 2% 
Target 
Measure 
Headline CPI9 Headline CPI Headline CPI Headline CPI 
Decision 
Maker(s) 
Minister of 
Finance 
& 
Governor of 
RBNZ 
Government 
Bank of 
Canada 
& 
Government  
Federal Open 
Market 
Committee  
                                                      
 
9 Consumer Prices Index 
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Table 1: Overview of Targeting Regimes 
3.1 NEW ZEALAND 
Background 
With the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Act of 1989, New Zealand became 
the first IT regime in the world. At present, target inflation rate is set at an average of 
1 – 3% over the medium term, using headline Consumer Prices Index (CPI) as the 
target measure. The target is set by agreement between the Minister of Finance and 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank over their term of office. The Governor is the 
single decision maker within the RBNZ, and is appointed by Minister of Finance with 
advice from the Board. (Hammond, 2012) 
 
Since its adoption, IT appears to have been successful in stabilising inflation in New 
Zealand. (Brash, 2000) In particular, Figure 2 shows that New Zealand has managed 
to keep inflation mostly on target following the adoption of IT – a remarkable feat 
when one compares inflation rates post-1988 with that of the pre-1988 period. 
 
 
(Source: Brash, 2000) 
 
Figure 2: Annual Inflation Rates in New Zealand and Selected OECD Countries, 
1970 - 2000 
 
Future of IT 
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Despite its successes, there has been similar speculation amongst politicians and 
academics in New Zealand regarding IT’s successes and failures following Frankel’s 
weblog post speculating the ‘death of inflation targeting’. (cf. Nolan, 2012; Tarrant, 
2012; Parker, 2012) In particular, Labour Party member David Parker appeared to 
have stated in news reports that he was sympathetic to Frankel’s assessment of IT’s 
demise even in the context of New Zealand, the (rather successful) pioneer of IT. (cf. 
Nolan, 2012; Parker, 2012) 
 
3.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
Background 
In October 1992, British newspapers reported that for the first time that monetary 
policy in the United Kingdom would be based on an explicit target for inflation. 
(Hammond, 2012) At present, a point target of 2% is set, using twelve-month 
increase in headline CPI as the target measure. The target is set by the government, 
and reaffirmed each year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the annual budget 
statement. (Hammond, 2012) 
 
Future of IT 
In mid-December 2012, future Bank of England (BoE) governor, then Bank of 
Canada Governor Mark Carney raised the possibility of central banks targeting 
nominal gross domestic product - a mix of GDP and inflation - rather than a single 
inflation target. (Dmitracova, O., D. Milliken and A. Mohammed, 2012) This comment 
was initially perceived to be a sign that the incoming BoE governor might push for 
the exit of the UK from IT and the adoption of NGDPT, sparking a series of news 
articles that predicted a ‘sea-changing moment’ in UK monetary policy. (Weisenthal, 
2012)  
 
However, in swift response to these predictions, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne commented, ‘... [a]ny decisions about the (monetary policy) 
framework are decisions for the government, a government accountable to 
parliament ... If you were to move away from it, the parliament would want to be 
satisfied that you were getting some very significant rewards in return for moving 
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away from that.’ (Dmitracova, O., D. Milliken and A. Mohammed, 2012) At the time of 
writing, debate and speculations continue in the UK media regarding the possibility 
of adopting a new TR. 
 
3.3 CANADA 
Background 
Canada adopted an inflation-targeting regime in February 1991, with a target of 2 per 
cent since 1995. (Bank of Canada, 2011) It uses headline CPI as the target 
measure, with core inflation as an operational guide. Both the Bank of Canada (BoC) 
and the government set the target jointly. (Hammond, 2012) 
 
An interesting story surrounds Canada’s adoption of inflation targeting. In 1993, the 
BoC governor was John Crow, a forceful advocate of inflation targeting who wanted 
to keep the target inflation at below 2%, i.e. choosing a target range of 0.5% to 2.5%. 
Then-Finance Minister Paul Martin, on the other hand, wanted a target range of 1% 
to 3%. While the difference may seem small, Crow had wanted to keep moving the 
target even lower, which would have added further strain to an economy with deep 
spending cuts on the horizon. Within a matter of months, Crow’s term as governor of 
BoC ended, and Martin got his way with a 2% target, which remains in place today. 
(cf. Curry, 2011; Hammond, 2012) 
 
Future of IT 
In 2001, the BoC began to conduct extensive studies on the feasibility of adopting 
PLT, leading the media to speculate as to whether Canada would be the first to exit 
from the IT regime and to adopt PLT as has been suggested by economists 
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. (Economist.com, 2011) However, in 
2011, the BoC renewed its inflation target for the next five years at 2%, sending a 
strong signal that its brief consideration of switching to PLT in the early 2000s is now 
a bygone. According to economist Christopher Ragan (2011), sticking with the status 
quo was only one option under debate among monetary experts in the lead-up to 
renewal of the Bank of Canada’s inflation-targeting mandate.  In particular, Ragan 
(2011) also noted that the renewal of the status quo keeps in place a coherent 
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monetary policy regime that has served Canadians well. The next review will take 
place in 2015 – 16, where the question of monetary policy innovation in this respect 
is likely to arise again.  
 
3.4 UNITED STATES 
Background 
Although little of existing academic literature has acknowledged the United States 
(US) as having an explicit IT regime, the consensus up till January 2012 has been 
that the US is an implicit inflation targeter. In the context of the current global 
financial crisis, America faces falling inflation and short-term interest rates at zero. 
This prompted Charles Evans, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, to 
propose in October 2010 that the Fed adopt a temporary price-level target. 
(Economist.com, 2010) In principle, the goal of a temporary switch to PLT would be 
to raise expected inflation and lower real short-term interest rates at a time when 
nominal rates are stuck near zero. However, Evans also suggested that he would 
eventually have the Fed – which had no official inflation target then – revert to 
focusing on the inflation rate. (Economist.com, 2010) 
 
On the other hand, Altig (2010) argued that the United States should simply adopt 
PLT and maintain a price-level target. He found Evan’s proposition problematic as it 
might give a confusing impression that the US Federal Reserve Bank is jumping 
from one framework to another – a move that might compromise the Fed’s hard-won 
credibility. Not only would a long-term PLT regime be a credible and clear policy 
stance, it is also ‘consistent with long-standing Federal Open Market Committee 
behaviour’. (Altig, 2010) 
 
Future of IT 
In spite of the arguments above, in January 2012, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) announced for the first time an explicit, numerical inflation target 
of 2% annually, using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as 
its target measure. In doing so, the Federal Reserve has clearly joined the league of 
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IT regimes around the world. (Spicer, J., 2012; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
2012) 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
 
To come to the conclusion that politics should be included in the framework on TR 
choice, we need to show that politics can affect a country’s choice of TR. 
Quantitatively, the closest proxy that would allow us to establish this would have 
been to show with rigorous statistical analysis, that the variable ‘politics’ (which I 
assume to be continuous) has a statistically significant coefficient. That is, we need 
at least to show that politics is statistically correlated with the choice of targeting 
regimes.  
 
Unfortunately, the scope of present discussion does not permit such extensive 
quantitative analysis, and the sample size of past monetary policy regime changes 
that can be tested is probably insufficient to yield robust results. Therefore, I have 
opted instead for a qualitative approach. I rely heavily on contextual analyses of 
debates occurring in the media, notably amongst economists, central bankers and 
political figures, to get a sense of the influence that political considerations may have 
had on the TR. In particular, I focus on the contextual information arising from 
political sources that are important to understanding why a TR was chosen, or why 
countries may not switch to another TR (i.e. “choosing” the status quo). 
 
First, consider the influence that politicians have over TR choices. A quick scan at 
Table 1 reveals that three out of the four case studies (namely Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK) presented involve the government in some way as a decision 
maker of the inflation target. We can infer from these arrangements that PLT or 
NGDPT will involve similar influence of the government on TR. Given that the 
government as a political actor is involved in the decision-making process of target-
setting, they are also highly likely to have a say in the choice of TR.  
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We note in the case of Canada that a political actor such as Paul Martin was able to 
influence the TR by making use of the mandated cooperation between the central 
bank and the Minister of Finance in setting the target. (cf. Curry, 2011) Turning our 
attention to the United Kingdom, we find that the recent debate sparked by Carney’s 
comments on NGDPT, and in particular, Osborne’s comments, suggests that TR 
choice is dependent on political factors as much as it is on rational argumentation. 
We find also in the case of New Zealand that David Parker’s comments on inflation 
targeting show that politicians are actively involving themselves in monetary policy 
debates, and hope to influence actual TR choice indirectly through such statements. 
 
Secondly, consider the influence of government’s desire for re-election on the choice 
of TR. Given that they are able to influence TR to begin with, the desire for re-
election means that TR choice will be heavily influenced by the political costs of 
changes to TR. Notably, any change in TR involves political costs, especially in a 
country where the government has an explicit role in setting the target and thus the 
targeting regime. For example, in order for the BoE to convince the government to 
change the TR, e.g. from IT to NGDPT, it will have to convince the government that 
the change will bring about significant successes, and is worth the cost of doing so.  
(Dmitracova, O., D. Milliken and A. Mohammed, 2012) Canada and New Zealand 
also stand as possible exemplars of this observation, as various reports on both 
countries have repeatedly cited the success of the present regime in controlling 
inflation as a reason for maintaining the status quo, even as debates and studies 
have been underway to examine possible alternatives. We can perhaps infer that 
there is an inertia politically to undertake change in these situations, especially when 
a switch to PLT or NGDPT might mean sustaining periods of inflation above target 
initially – a move that could well be perceived negatively by the public and is thus 
politically unpalatable. 
 
Therefore, I conclude that empirical case studies support the extended theoretical 
framework proposed in Section 2, and that we should rightly think of TR choice as a 
function of economic theory, empirical precedents, policy execution constraints, and 
politics. Based on this, I argue that as far as the case studies go, IT has yet to meet 
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its demise. In particular, political conditions suggest that support for maintaining the 
status quo, i.e. IT, is high. 
 
First, consider the case of New Zealand. Although IT appears to have served New 
Zealand well, it was not spared from speculation in the recent debate regarding IT’s 
demise. It is extremely interesting that Labour party member David Parker has 
spoken up against inflation targeting, but given that the Labour party is at present not 
the ruling party, it is unlikely that they will be able to exert any force on the TR for 
now. That the target is set by agreement between the Minister of Finance and the 
Governor of the RBNZ also go towards highlighting the influence of political factors in 
TR choice. We can expect, that given Labour’s stance, the current ruling National 
party is likely to maintain the status quo, i.e. IT, and exert its influence on this 
decision through the mandated agreement with the RBNZ.  
 
Second, consider the case of the United Kingdom. Without belabouring the recent 
debate on NGDPT targeting sparked by Carney’s comments, we note that although 
Osborne was quoted in a separate statement as saying that he remained ‘open’ to a 
switch in the UK TR a few days following the first statement, it appears from his initial 
remarks that political concerns could well be the barrier preventing the UK from 
adopting NGDP level as a target. (Kirkup, 2012) 
 
Last, but not least, that the US has only become an inflation targeter in January 2012 
suggests that inflation targeting as a regime may well survive for a while yet. In a 
country where academic debate on this topic is aplenty, the explicit adoption of an 
inflation target sends a strong signal of confidence in the TR’s ability to achieve 
macroeconomic goals. Even though NGDPT and PLT continue to be peddled as 
‘better alternatives’, it is likely that IT will be given a few years of grace in the US 
before policy actually makes a shift in any other direction. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
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Thus far, I have argued that the current analytical framework used in arguments for 
and against various TRs is insufficient. To the extent that such a framework should 
be able to explain how TR choice is actually made, or how variables affect TR 
choice, I proposed that politics be include as a fourth determinant. Using case 
studies, I showed qualitative support for the thesis that the political variable is indeed 
a determinant of TR choice, and one that can explain why despite compelling 
theoretical arguments for switching TRs, countries may not always make such 
switches. 
 
5.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The key takeaway from the extended theoretical framework and the case study 
analyses is that politics has a strong influence over a country’s choice of TR. 
Although it may be true that in some countries (e.g. UK, US, Japan), IT as a 
monetary policy has failed to deliver its due, the influence of political concerns over 
TR choice means that a switch is unlikely in the near future. The implication of this 
conclusion is that although we find in many IT countries that IT has failed to rein 
inflation in, or that IT will be increasingly unable to do so as we approach the zero 
lower bound, the empirical uncertainty and complexity of introducing a never-tested 
TR increases the political costs of adopting a new TR significantly. Therefore, 
although the system may have failed, it is unlikely to be phased out soon, in stark 
contrast to the previous era of TR change, from monetary targeting to IT, where 
failure of the system in the 1970s was swiftly succeeded by TR change in the late 
1980s to early 1990s. 
 
Furthermore, even as we speak of the ‘demise’ of IT in the context of the present 
crisis, we note that IT has become the TR of choice in many emerging economies. 
IT’s success in countries such as New Zealand and Australia have made it a 
framework suitable for emerging countries to emulate. It would be hasty to speak of 
IT’s demise as a whole at a time where the world is divided into several large groups 
of countries at different stages of economic development. For emerging countries 
that are just beginning to contend with the macroeconomic goal of stabilising inflation, 
Lucotte found that central bank independence, policy-makers’ incentives and 
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characteristics of the domestic political system has a great influence on the adoption 
and success of IT. (Lucotte, 2010) Therefore, even as IT approaches systemic 
failure in some developed countries, new adopters of IT may find success and refuge 
in its relatively parsimonious policy requirements for some time to come. 
 
5.2 CURRENT LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
In this paper, I have attempted to revise an existing analytical framework for 
targeting regime choice, focusing on inflation targeting and the possibility of adopting 
of new monetary policy regimes in light of the recent financial crisis. As far the 
proposed analytical framework is concerned, I have largely omitted any quantitative 
testing as discussed in Section 4. Relying solely on qualitative contextual analysis, I 
have shown that my proposed framework can be empirically supported. It would, 
however, be extremely interesting to conduct quantitative analyses to support the 
hypothesis further. In particular, to obtain a larger sample size required for 
quantitative analysis, we could also generalise the sample to instances of TR change 
to include cases of adopting inflation targeting between 1989 and 2012, as well as 
emerging economies that are currently considering inflation targeting. 
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ANNEX A: LIST OF INFLATION TARGETING COUNTRIES, 201210 
Country Date of IT adoption Inflation Target 2012 
New Zealand 1990 1 – 3% 
Canada 1991 2%11 
United Kingdom 1992 2% 
Sweden 1993 2% 
Australia 1993 2 – 3% 
Czech Republic 1997 2 ± 1% 
Israel12 1997 1 – 3% 
Poland 1998 2.5 ± 1% 
Brazil 1999 4.5 ± 2% 
Chile 1999 3 ± 1% 
Colombia 1999 2 – 4%13 
South Africa 2000 3 – 6% 
Thailand 2000 3 ± 1.5% 
Korea 2001 3 ± 1% 
Mexico 2001 3 ± 1% 
Iceland 2001 2.5% 
Norway 2001 2.5% 
Hungary 2001 3% 
Peru 2002 2 ± 1% 
Philippines 2002 4 ± 1% 
Guatemala 2005 4.5 ± 1% 
Indonesia 2005 4.5 ± 1% 
Romania 2005 2 ± 1% 
Armenia 2006 4 ± 1.5% 
Turkey 2006 5 ± 2% 
Serbia 2006 4 ± 1.5% 
                                                      
 
10 The information contained in this table is accurate as of 14 December 2012 
11 Over 6 – 8 quarters, flexible 
12 Israel was informally an inflation targeter from 1992, but only formally adopted inflation targeting in 
1997. 
13 With 3% as the mid-point for legal purposes 
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Ghana 200714 8.7 ± 2% 
(Sources: Roger, 2010; Hammond, 2012) 
  
                                                      
 
14 Ghana was informally an inflation targeter from 2002, but only formally adopted inflation targeting in 
2007 
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ANNEX B: WOOLLEY’S TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL FACTORS 
 Governmental Non-Governmental 
Variable Type I 
- Election Contests 
- Dynamics of Public Opinion 
- Bureaucratic Politics 
- Interest Group Politics 
Type II 
- Wage Bargaining 
- Strike Behaviour 
- Business Confidence 
Standard Type IV 
- Division of Power between 
Executive and Legislature 
- Structure and Control of 
Public Bureaucracy 
- Central Bank Independence 
Type III 
- Degree of Unionisation 
- Links of Parties and Unions 
- Organisation of Business 
Sector 
- Financial Structure 
- National Preferences for 
Inflation/Unemployment 
(Source: Woolley, 1983)  
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